Abstract
Introduction

1.
Asymmetric information has become one of the most influential theoretical concepts in explaining competitive insurance market. In contract theory, asymmetric information is the situation when one party of an economic transaction possesses information that is not available to the other contractual party.
In fact, Asymmetric information arises when an informational gap exists between an insurer and an insured. In such situation, insureds are more informed about their own characteristics or actions than their insurer. Potentially, this could be a harmful situation because the insured can take advantage of the insurer's lack of knowledge. In a nutshell, asymmetric information can leads to a problematic because it creates opportunities for lying and cheating by insured, which by the way can induce market inefficiency or even failure (Arrow 1963) .
In this field, a number of empirical studies propose to measure the presence of residual asymmetric information problems in several automobile insurance markets. One can refers to Dahlby (1983 Dahlby ( /1992 for Canada, Puelz and Snow (1994) for USA, Richaudeau (1999) for France, Saito (2006) for Japan, Kim et al. (2009) for Korea, Englund (2010) for Denmark, Shi and Valdez (2011) for Singapore, and Li et al. (2013) for Taiwan case. Besides a recent review article by Dionne et al. (2013) which summarized the theoretical and the empirical literature concerning asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance market.
In the Canadian automobile insurance market, two initial studies (Dahlby, 1983 and 1992) have estimated the sign of the correlation between the level of insurance coverage and ex-post realizations of risk. Puelz and Snow (1994) found positive coverage-risk correlation using individual data obtained from a Georgia insurer.
However, several empirical studies show no evidence for asymmetric information. Using a French data set, Richaudeau (1999) as well as Chiappori and Salanié (2000) find no systematic relationship between coverage and risk. In addition, Dionne et al. (2001) reach a similar conclusion for the Canadian automobile insurance market: those who are more likely to submit claims do not buy more insurance. Moreover, these researchers criticized Puelz and Snow (1994) for failing to consider nonlinear effects.
On the other hand, Cohen (2005) did not find any correlation for beginning drivers 1, she founds a strong correlation for experienced drivers. Although, the study suggested the importance of "learning" in this market. Saito (2006) used an individual data from the Japanese auto insurance market, where insurance rates are strictly regulated. First, he found a positive but not statistically significant correlation between the crash risk and the purchase of own-vehicle coverage, even under the control of all variables observed by the insurer. Second, he concluded that there was a significant and negative correlation between coverage and risk when they are defined as the purchase of a zerodeductible policy and a crash risk.
Recent empirical studies in the competitive insurance market show a presence of asymmetric information in these markets. To take some of the outstanding studies, Grun-Rehomme and Benlagha (2007) examined the choice between basic third party coverage and deductible variable for beginning and experienced drivers. Their study used 4 guarantees' types concerning the year 2004, this was made after the new circulation security measures' implementation and the decrease of mortals' accidents road. Using a bivariate ordered model, the researchers find a significant positive correlation risk-coverage for beginning drivers which choice the third party insurance plus deductible variable for French data.
We can notice that most of the previous empirical focuses on the coverage-risk correlation. This paper contributes to the literature by reexamining whether such coverage-risk correlation exists.
The aim of this paper is to investigate on residual asymmetric information in the Tunisian automobile insurance market and to find ways to improve and reduce the negative impact of asymmetric information on resource allocation. Hence, the objectives of this research proposal are to test the presence of the adverse selection in the Tunisian insurance market and to determine various factors affecting the contact choice and accident occurrence in the studied insurance market.
For this purpose, we use a data set that includes all information that an insurer had about its policyholders for the 2009 year. Our paper differs from earlier studies in two points;
First, we use a recent data from the Tunisian insurance market, which is not investigated in the empirical literature. This data is concerning the year 2009, after the implementation of the new no-claims bonus class. Second, we use the two-stage regression analysis developed by Richaudeau (1999) where the probit model is used for coverage choice equation (first stage) and the negative binomial model for the accident frequency equation (second stage).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents briefly the Tunisian automobile insurance market. Then, section 3 presents the models used and the empirical test for the presence of asymmetric information. Section 4 describes the data and reports a descriptive statistics analysis of the data set. Section 5 analyses and discusses the empirical results. The last section concludes and discusses possible future work.
The Tunisian Automobile Insurance Market 2.
In Tunisia, the insurance sector plays an important role in the development of the private sector and the modernization of the securities markets 2 . For instance, the Tunisian market characterized by the presence of 22 insurance companies operating in 24 regions. We find 12 of these companies engage in multi-branch operations, 6 are single branch companies (3 specialize in life insurance, 1 in expert insurance, 1 in credit insurance and 1 in reinsurance) and 4 are offshore companies authorized to conduct operations with nonresidents.
The insurance industry is dominated by the private sector, with 61.27% in 2010. The level of average premium has increased from 98,355 TND (in 2009 to 106,195 TND in 2010 .
Looking to their products' distribution in 2008, insurance companies use about 697 intermediaries (614 insurance agents, 55 brokers and 28 agents authorized to sell life insurance) forming a network making insurance policies presents in all different regions. They employ also about 10 actuaries and 1008 experts and commissioners of damage authorized to assess and evaluate the losses and damages.
In 2010, the Tunisian market structure has not changed; the automobile insurance contributes to total business with 46.18% of the market. The life insurance branch, with 14.45%, follows it. The group health insurance, various risks, transport and fire insurance branches experienced the highest growth rates, with 13.05%, 11.22%, 6.76% and 5.65%, respectively.
Methodology
3.
To investigate the presence of adverse selection in the Tunisian automobile insurance market, we employ two models: the two-stage regression analysis developed by Richaudeau (1999) and the bivaiat bivariate probit model introduced by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001) . Richaudeau (1999) In this modeling, the first stage aims to estimate the coverage choice and the second stage estimates the accident occurrence.
The two-stage regression analysis of
Choice of a coverage equation (first stage)
In this stage, the coverage choice can be defined as a dichotomous variable:
A maximum likelihood probit regression is employed to estimate the deductible choice equation. Then, the generalized residual is given by: (3) Where (.) and (.) are, respectively, the density and cumulative distribution functions of the standard normal distribution, and is an estimated coefficient vector. If the is positive (negative), then the policyholder has subscribed a third party coverage policy.
The accident Frequency equation (second stage)
In the second stage, we estimate the probability of accident using a count data model, and more precisely, a negative binomial model of the number of accidents. To test for asymmetric information, the residual obtained from the binary choice coverage model in equation (3) is used as input when estimating the negative binomial model3. The probability of having yi accidents is given by: (4) Where (.) is the Gamma function, and are estimated coefficients vectors. The regression coefficient captures the correlation between the insurance coverage and the frequency of accidents, conditional on the effects of all observables on both the coverage choice and the accident frequency. If is positive and statistically significant, we conclude the existence of asymmetric information. This will be our test of the efficiency in the Tunisian automobile insurance market.
The Richaudeau's test may induce an estimation bias in the second-stage equation. Using the result of Murphy and Topel (1985), we correct this bias by testing the statistical significance of . In this last test, the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for two-stage maximum likelihood model is defined as:
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Based on the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) statistic, the negative binomial regression fits our data better than the Poisson regression (see statistics for dispersion parameters in
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Bivariate probit model
To test the conditional independence between the contract choice and the accident occurrence, we follow the empirical approach proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) . In fact, they use a bivariate probit model to examine the coveragerisk correlation. In this modeling, the accident occurrence is presented as follows:
Hence, the bivariate model is composed by two equations: -The equation of the deductible Choice
In this specification, and are coefficients to be estimated. represents the matrix of observable independent variables. The two error terms, and satisfy the following standard conditions:
In this model, measures the correlation between coverage and risk and allow as to conclude about the presence of residual adverse selection in the portfolio.
Empirical Methodology 4.
Data
To investigate the asymmetric information, we consider a portfolio of 54040 policies that contains information for 31125 policyholders
In this empirical study, we employ 11 variables, consisting of the policyholder's car's and accident's characteristics. The description of different variables are presented in the appendix (1).
In our analysis, the coverage choice measured by third party coverage versus comprehensive coverage rather than low premium versus high premium. Thus, we define it as follows:
Summary statistics
To begin with, let us give an overview of our data set.
The file contains 5301 women (17.03% of total population) and 25824 males (82.97%) of which 15742 leading vehicle for commuting and family use and 15383 driving vehicles for commercial use. The average premium is 314TND and the maximum premium that the insurer receives is 5909 TND. The number of accidents stretches from no accidents up to 8 accidents, where the mean value is 0.20 indicating a low frequency of accidents.
Most vehicles are of French brand 18306 (or 58.81% of all cars), with 9216 cars for private use and 9090 cars for commercial use, and which are respectively 50.34% and 49.66%. Moreover, about 30% of the drivers live in the Coast of Tunisia especially in the governorate of Sousse. It is very eventful on the economic, administrative and social capital. Concerning the job of the policyholders' variable, employees represent about 50% of the population and 21% are functionaries whereas 12% are artisan.
In our sample of 31125 contracts, we have information on the number of responsible accidents reported by the insured to his insurer in 2009. Our data includes 822 contracts (1176 contracts) that have at least one accident during the contract year for the beginning drivers (experienced drivers), 620 (745) contracts claimed two accidents, 114 (161) contracts made 3 accidents and 73 (123) contracts claimed more than three accidents (See table1). No single policyholder in our portfolio incurred more than eight accidents during the year. Table 2 presents the estimation results of the probit modeling that is the first step regression analysis of Richaudeau (1999) . The left-hand side of this table suggests the estimation for the beginning drivers whereas the right-hand side presents the estimation for the experienced drivers.
Results
5.
The choice of coverage
For the beginning drivers, commuting and family use cars are more likely to be insured by comprehensive insurance than commercial use cars. In addition, we note that females have a greater probability of choosing a comprehensive coverage than males, indicating perhaps that their risk-aversion is greater. The probability of buying third party insurance is higher for the policyholders who have age between 56 and 75 years.
For the experienced drivers, the probability of choosing third party coverage is more important for female and for the policyholders who are older than 31 years. Primary use cars are more likely to be insured by comprehensive coverage than commercial use cars.
One interesting point to note is that the jobs of the policyholders also have a role in the choice of coverage. The probability of choosing third party coverage decreases with the senior executive, the artisan, the employee and the unemployed. 
The probability of having an accident
According to the estimated parameters in the second equation related to the occurrence of accidents (the second part of table 4), the probability of making at least one accident at the insurer increases according to female and to the agent lives in big Tunis. Furthermore, this probability decreases with job of the drivers. Particularly, the accident occurrence is negatively related to the unemployed person, the employee and the retired person. Table 3 shows that many exogenous variables have a significant effect on accidents frequency for both beginning and experience drivers. A special note is the need for some exogenous variables. First, we examine the frequency of accidents for beginning drivers. The positive sign for the coefficients of gender and the residence area that suggests that female and policyholders live in big Tunis have a higher chance to incur accidents. In addition, we observe a positive effect of vehicle's use on the probability of accident. The policyholder specifies the primary use of the insured car as for commercial use that has a higher chance of accidents. Second, we move to examine the accident frequencies for experienced drivers. We observe that the accident frequency is positively related to the job and the residence area of policyholders. This probability decreases according to the age of drivers. 
Testing for asymmetric information
According to table 4, the first estimation results show that the correlation between the error terms of the two binary equations is positive. Thus, the estimated value of is 0.126 for beginning drivers. This association is strong and significant with a p-value of 0.000. Hence, we find that policyholders who purchase better coverage tend to be more prone to make claims. We therefore, find an evidence of asymmetric information, either with reference to adverse selection or with reference to moral hazard, especially when the observed variables are taking into account The second estimation results show that we again find a positive correlation between coverage-risk for experienced drivers. The estimates value of is 0.001. The p-value of , however, suggests that this association is not statistically significant ( = 0.963). Therefore, we find no evidence of adverse selection or moral hazard. This result is consistent with that of Saito (2006) . Table 3 provides, also, the estimate of the risk-coverage correlation for beginning drivers and experienced drivers. The negative binomial model gives us a similar result as the probit bivariate model. For the beginning drivers, the coefficient of the coverage choice residual variable is positive and statistically significant, this finding clearly demonstrates that asymmetric information is present in the Tunisian automobile insurance market. However, this coefficient becomes negative and statistically insignificant for the experienced drivers.
To sum up, all these results show no evidence of asymmetric information for experienced drivers and the existence of evidence for beginning drivers. 
Conclusion
6.
In this paper, we examined coverage-risk relationship in the Tunisian automobile insurance market using a cross sectional data from a major insurer. We used the bivariate probit model and the negative binomial model to help describing any evidence of private information. When analyzing the entire portfolio of policyholders from the insurer, all our procedures give the same results. For the beginning drivers, we found significant positive relationship between policyholder's coverage choice and the occurrence of accidents, indicating the presence of adverse selection. This relationship provides evidence that some unobserved and unobservable factors affects the insurance contract choice. Therefore, for the experienced drivers, asymmetric information seems to be at most a negligible phenomenon in the insurance automobile market.
One major criticism of the conditional correlation approach with cross sectional data is that it does not allow separation adverse selection from moral hazard. Our analysis is limited to a combined result of the two asymmetric information problems. However, as suggested by Abbring et al. (2003) , dynamic data could help distinguish between the adverse selection and moral hazard. Finally, we leave this as one of the future research directions to pursue.
Appendix 1.
Characteristics of the Driver
Gender: 1 if the insured is male (82.97%); 0 if the insured is female (17.03%).
Age: the age of the policyholder (mean =45.49, std. dev. =13.29, min= 18, max= 98). 
